2017

Location: Kenya

ID#: 2017.Cocoa.01

Beneficiary was sourcing cocoa beans, with claims of Ugandan origin, from a supplier based in Kampala, Uganda. After further investigation, it appeared these beans were coming from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This supplier was not able to provide any documentation to reaffirm Ugandan origin nor proof of legal export from the DRC, therefore, all contracts were immediately terminated with this supplier.

2018

Location: Beni, DRC

ID#: 2018.Cocoa.01

Several shipments of cocoa beans from the Beni territory were either prevented from transit or destroyed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

2019

Location: Beni, DRC

ID#: 2019.Cocoa.01

Several shipments of cocoa beans from the Beni territory were either prevented from transit or destroyed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2019.Cocoa.02

The border between the DRC and Rwanda was closed due to the Ebola cases reaching near Goma, the border town, and the outbreak being declared a global health crisis.

Location: Beni-Goma, DRC

ID#: 2019.Cocoa.03

A bridge was destroyed by heavy rains on the only transitable road between Beni and Goma delaying shipments of cocoa beans from the farms to the factory by several weeks. Bridge was eventually repaired.

2020

Location: Beni, DRC

ID#: 2020.Cocoa.01

Several shipments of cocoa beans from the Beni territory were either prevented from transit or destroyed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Location: Beni, DRC

ID#: 2020.Cocoa.02

At the height of the 1st wave of the Covid-19 pandemic, the ministry in charge of approving cocoa and coffee exports froze all exports countrywide for approximately 6 months time. This was due to a dispute between two ministries over who had the authority to issue a particular tax on said exports. While domestic production and sales were able to continue, all exported products were blocked, preventing sales and delivery to customers.

2021

Location: Beni, DRC

ID#: 2021.Cocoa.01

The same ministry noted in incident ID#: 2020.Cocoa.02 reinstated a countrywide block of all exports yet again for the same reasons claimed the year before.

Location, Beni, DRC

ID#: 2021.Cocoa.02

Shipments from the Beni Territory have been disrupted due to an increase in conflict which now includes US Special Forces, the Congolese Army and the Ugandan Army advancing on positions of the ADF. Ongoing conflict has delayed new shipments of cocoa beans along with coffee and chia seeds as well.

2022

Location, Beni, DRC

ID#: 2022.Cocoa.01

Shipments from the Beni Territory have been disrupted due to an increase in conflict which now includes US Special Forces, the Congolese Army and the Ugandan Army advancing on positions of the ADF. Ongoing conflict has delayed new shipments of cocoa beans along with coffee and chia seeds as well.

2018 

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2018.Sugar.01

While in transit across the border into Goma from Rwanda, a group of Congolese officials demanded payment, in cash, for the transit of goods. The payment was refused so the officials tried denying entry into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The driver transiting the sugar simply parked the vehicle and removed the keys. After blocking traffic for several minutes, the officials gave up their attempts and released the vehicle without any payments.

2018

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.01

While transporting their cooperative beneficiary with gold in DFP1’s vehicle, their driver swerved to avoid oncoming traffic. While doing so, DFP1’s vehicle hit and killed a child, six years of age, while walking home from school. This accident was in no way the fault of the driver or DFP1, rather the fault of a bus attempting to illegally pass traffic in the opposing lane. However, DFP1 has failed to properly report this incident and failed to reply to multiple requests to see the issue resolved. Instead, DFP1 gave their driver $1,200 and instructions to handle the issue independently of the organization. As the cooperative beneficiary had nothing to do with this incident, other than being in the vehicle, the beneficiary continued to work with and support their activities and purchase their gold. It should also be noted that DFP1 violated local law by transporting gold in an NGO-registered and plated vehicle.

Location: Nyamurhale, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.02

1. The diggers exceed enormously the maximum depth allowed for pits (30 meters) established by the mining code.
2. Presence of a pregnant woman at the washing station.
3. A miner stole a bag of mineralized sand from the Eugle pit.
4. There were two landslides in the Chokola pit. A miner was covered by the earth but he was saved by his colleagues. No one was injured.
5. A miner stole a 40 kg bag of ore from the pit, it occurred in the evening when the miners were already out of the pits.
6. 15 children under 16 years old wash the mineralized sand at the washing station.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.03

DFP1 received a phone call from a buying agent stating that one of his colleagues, also a buying agent, had been kidnapped. After alerting the police and SAEMAPE, who began an investigation, it was discovered that the alleged kidnapped victim had been “released” by his assailants to retrieve money from the other buying agent as ransom. As there was no evidence that the buying agent had been kidnapped after speaking with various neighbors and community members, the police looked into the buying agent’s personal life and discovered that he probably kidnapped himself to divert the buying money for personal reasons. All business was halted with the buying agent in question, and a new buying agent was hired; the police continue to investigate the situation.

Location: Rusizi, Rwanda

ID#: 2018.Gold.04

Due to delays at the Rwandese border with Bukavu, which appeared to be intentional, causied the beneficiary to call for stakeholder support. After 6 hours to process paperwork, the beneficiary was released, however, risk to the high value cargo was increased significantly and additional security was required.

Location: Nyamurhale, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.05

1. A child, about 12 years old, who used to frequent the washing station was selling approximately 0.1 g of gold to a manager. This product was taken from the waste he had treated at the washing station. He sold the gold for 6000 Fc.
2. Presence of children under 16 years old who were washing and sieving ore at the washing station. During this week (25 – 31 March 2018) about 15 children were present at the station every day, crushing and washing the minerals.

Location: Nyamurhale, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.06

1. About 25 children, all under the age of 16, were washing mineralized sand and crushing ore at the washing station.
2. ITOA receipts were incorrectly completed by the SAEMAPE agent and mismatched from their tamper-proof bags.

Location: Nyamurhale, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.06

Approximately ten children, all under the age of 16 years, were not only present at the washing station but were seen washing and crushing the ore on a daily basis.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.07

While crossing the border from DRC into Rwanda, DRC security officials attempted to stop the transit of goods, claiming they needed to ‘inspect’ them first. The beneficiary refused to enter a private room with the security officials as they had no authority to their request. The beneficiary immediately called a UN partner program to ensure their safety and transparency. Two UN officials arrived shortly thereafter and were able to assist the beneficiary in avoiding what was clearly an attempt to extort money.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.08

Security Forces interrogation x 2- Aggressively interrogated beneficiaries including a visibly pregnant woman. Both were forcibly brought into interrogation rooms located within the state security force’s local office, twice, each time they seized her passport and accused the managing director of insulting the president (Kabila). Demand for bribes later followed while increasing the levels of threats and accusations. Colleagues from the beneficiary’s team were able to call a civil society partner and a group of civil society members came and pulled both beneficiary staff from the interrogation room. During the events, which took place over the course of a week, the Federation, on behalf of the beneficiary, sent Donor1 a formal request for assistance which was not replied to.

Location: Kigali, Rwanda

ID#: 2018.Gold.09

While transiting the same material shipment as noted in incident 2018.Gold.08, a second incident happened upon goods clearance by Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) at the Kigali airport. After walking transporter through the first security screening checkpoint, the RRA official seemed to whisper something to a Rwandan National Police (RNP) officer. That same RNP officer later stopped the transporter and demanded to see the transit documentation accompanying the material shipment. Even after reviewing the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) certificate which documented the material origin from the DRC, the RNP officer demanded to see the “other documentation” which he later stated was the Rwandan Certificate of Origin. After showing all the legal paperwork from the DRC the RNP officer stated the transporter still needed to claim the material’s origin from Rwanda. The transporter refused to falsify this documentation and immediately called the US Embassy for assistance. RNP later confronted the transporter, after covering their name tags, stating he should not have called the embassy, he was not being officially detained but he also wasn’t free to leave. The Transporter remained in the airport overnight and later discussed the issue with the chief of police the next morning who stated, “it was just a misunderstanding” and that all future shipments should go through him to avoid future confusion of his officers. Shipments no longer transit through this border crossing or the Kigali International Airport.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.10

1. A member of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) demanded that CODEMA pay an illegal fee (USD 10.00) during travel on the Mambasa-Bunia route. CODEMA and DFP1 notified the Comité Provincial de Suivi about this illegal payment in July 2018.
2. A miner from a non-validated site entered the Kafiawema site at which point he attempted to sell 1.86 grams of hard rock gold to the buying agent. Upon inspection, the buying agent noticed that it was in fact a piece of iron weighing 1.2 grams which was covered by a thin layer of gold weighing 0.84 grams.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.11

A buying agent requested to temporarily use the backpack of a miner. Inside this backpack was a small package of gold the miner had collected. When the backpack was returned to the miner, the package of gold had gone missing. The action taken to rectify this situation is to provide the buying agents with backpacks that can be used as well as verification that the backpacks are in good working order. The incident was reported to the security team on the mine site.

Location: Kampene, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.12

A landslide occurred in the Nyoso ya maboko ya nzambe pit from 19th to 27th July 2018. This pit was closed for a week and all activities were suspended following the clandestine sale of the gold that had been extracted while the pit was closed. After the suspension of activities, the miners had to do maintenance work through woodworking and tunneling.

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.12

While transiting the mineral through Goma airport, the state tax authorities attempted to extort payments from the transporter, claiming that there were missing documents that were required to export the material. Fortunately, the transporter was escorted by two mining state agents who were able to handle the situation and ensure the security of the transporter and materials until the transporter left the country.

Location: Chicago, USA

ID#: 2018.Gold.13

While in transit from Chicago to Grand Rapids with the material, TSA (Transportation Security Administration) required the traceability bag be cut open so they could see the contents of the bag. Thankfully, the transporter had other tempered evidence bags with him and was able to take a video of the opening and the resealing of an additional bag.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.14

A miner also occupying the position of Director-General of the site administration was found to be tampering with the manual scales used in the purchasing of gold from his mining team. This miner was arrested and fined for the infraction. In response, SAEMAPE’s Chef de Service has conducted retraining on traceability standards.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.15

Two men from the FARDC arrived at the Tokomeka mine site and attempted to extract payments to guarantee safety. These men were informed that they were at a conflict-free mine site that did not require their services. These men then stated that they would require payment on their next visit and proceeded to leave. The two men in question have not been reported to have returned to the mine site. The manager of the CODEMA cooperative was in the process of arranging a meeting with the Administrator of Mambasa Territory to address the issue.

Location: Nyamurhale, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.16

Although no beneficiary sourcing was taking place at the time from the Nyamurhale site, it was reported by DFP2 to have children present at the mining site. After further inquiry, DFP2 determined that the COMIANGWE cooperative had been approached by another DFP3 focusing on schooling children. The cooperative leader instructed her members to “bring their kids to work” so that the DFP3 could pay for their school fees. No further engagement of this cooperative is to take place until such time its leadership is replaced, though due larger to other considerations.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2018.Gold.17

For reasons unknown, recording of traceability data from DFP1 temporarily ceased (fault). As there was gold pre-financed by the beneficiary to the cooperative beneficiary, the beneficiary demanded that all gold be delivered to it in due order. DFP1 then facilitated a sale, 564 grams, to a known illicit actor with a history of money laundering and smuggling. This fault in recording was confirmed by the 3rd party private enterprise recording all traceability data offshore, described in their words as a “complete data blackout”. The beneficiary suspects this sale to an illicit actor was an attempt to conceal failures of DFP1s system. Since this incident, the beneficiary has enacted a policy to implement its own traceability and due diligence measures with all cooperative partners to prevent any future lapses in data management. Direct engagement of DFP1 has been kept at a minimum in anticipation of the program’s closeout.

2019

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.01

After returning from a field mission working on ASM gold, the beneficiary staff member was hospitalized for two weeks showing symptoms of poisoning. The precise means or motive could not be determined, however, after receiving two weeks of treatment the member made a full recovery. Who was behind the poisoning is currently unknown.

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.02

While transiting material through the local airport, for export, state tax authorities attempted to extort payments from the transporter, claiming that there were missing documents that were required to have in order to export the material. Fortunately, the transporter was escorted by two state mining agents who were able to handle the situation and ensure the security of the transporter and materials until the transporter left the country.

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.03

State security forces began visiting the beneficiaries offices more frequently, this time stating they were “unhappy with the current engagement with them”. This was perceived as a demand for illegal payments.

Location: Bunia, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.04 

While transporting material from Bunia to Bukavu, the transporter was pulled off the plane, that was about to take off, by the state security forces and other state agents claiming that the transporter did not have the appropriate documents to legally transport the material exposing the shipment to additional risk of theft. The transporter went through a series of interrogations, attempted extortion, and intimidation. The transporter was finally let go after contacting mining state agents who were able to provide supporting evidence that the transporter had all the legal documents required to transport the materials.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.05

After receiving approvals from a downstream buyer, Fair Congo started processing export documents for material from CODEMA that had been recently transferred from Bunia to Bukavu. While processing the documents, the downstream buyer sent an email canceling the purchase of the material due to reasons unrelated to Fair Congo, rather DFP1.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.06

Beneficiary received a forwarded notice stating that an in process export was canceled due to lack of consensus among downstream partners, there was no reciprocity in communication. Despite funds being spent by the request of the recipient the beneficiary has not been reimbursed.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.07 

The Central Bank of Congo sent a PV requesting to pay fees to renew the immatriculation number of the company and an additional fee to cover the cost of control, which was an illegal payment. The immatriculation number fees are a one-off payment made when applying for a new mining license. Request for paying renewal fees for the immatriculation number has never been approved by the national government. Beneficiary confirmed with the Secretary General of the Ministry of Mines that no payment should be made.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.08

After filing annual tax returns, several DGI agents decided to review annual financial reports and reported they discovered some “discrepancies”. From then onwards, the beneficiary received a variety of notices from the DGI office listing a plethora of fines and taxes claimed to be due. One of these was VAT on all past and current gold exports.

Location: United States

ID#: 2019.Gold.09

United States Customs and Border Patrol (USCBP) implemented a new Withhold Release Order (WRO) blocking all shipments of ASM gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All beneficiary shipments were halted during this period. An exemption to this WRO was issued formally to Chambers Federation by USCBP in June 2020.

Link to the related press release: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-modifies-withhold-release-order-gold-imports-democratic-republic

Location: Kampene, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.10

After heavy rainfall, a cooperative partner mine site collapsed killing 21 people and seriously injuring 10. Despite being falsely reported by several news outlets, this mine site has been validated since 2016 and is part of the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) [German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources] program. It is believed that the cooperative pit manager overseeing this portion of the open pit site was not ensuring that ore was completely removed. This additional weight on the sides of the pit, combined with heavy rains caused the pit to collapse in on itself. There were no children or pregnant women among the victims of this accident. This site is managed by the COMILU cooperative which has been in existence since the year 2000. While the beneficiary has not recently sourced from this site, it has several times in early 2019 and late 2018. This site had been marked for re-inspection before any sourcing may be reinitiated. Additional training will be provided to the cooperative, along with support from partner Donor Funded Program (DFP), to reinforce mine site safety protocols.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.11

The Central Bank of Congo withdrew funds from the account of Trust Merchant Bank (TMB) to cater for the renewal of the immatriculation number and fines which beneficiary was advised, by the Ministry of Mines, beneficiary’s legal council, and TMB’s own legal department, to be illegal taxes and not to be paid. TMB then issued an unauthorized overdraft loan to cover the remaining debt from the Central Bank without disclosing it to the beneficiary. This loan was found to have an effective APR of 50%. This interest bearing overdraft loan continued to gain interest for a year before TMB disclosed it to the beneficiary. While collection attempts by TMB continued, their main office legal department stated they issued “millions of dollars” a year in such loans to cover illegal taxation aimed at other private companies but would do what they can to help fight this illegal tax. It should be noted that these overdraft loans are issued well above the cost of issuance and are generating profit for the banking industry. This mechanism forces private companies in the DRC to pay illegal taxes. Failure to pay these illegal taxes can also lead to a complete ban by the Central Bank for company directors, meaning they can no longer operate in country unless they comply.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.12

DGI contacted both beneficiary staff multiple times to discuss “discrepancies” they found in the files and fines that would apply to that effect. Despite discussing with the state tax agents about those discrepancies, which were deemed by the beneficiary’s legal council as illegal, the beneficiary still received a notice. The total in the fine that would be owed to the DGI would be comparable to the beneficiary’s total 2018 revenue. The agency also stated in the notice that they intended to seize the beneficiary’s assets if the fines were not paid in full.

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.13

The beneficiary received communication from local civil society members that there were concerns over the targeting of beneficiary operations due to influence from a local illicit actor by the use of state security forces and state tax offices. The civil society also stated that the Chief of Party (COP) of a newly Donor1-funded program, was affiliated with this actor demonstrating a clear conflict of interest. Communication was sent to Donor1 about DFP4 stating that we were aware of their engagements with illicit actors and requested a formal meeting. The beneficiary believes the Chief of Party of the Donor1-funded program discussed the allegations against her with her illicit colleague who then in turn ramped up his efforts to harass the beneficiary through his accomplices in the local state security service putting the beneficiary staff at risk. DFP4 program staff confirmed that they were in communication with the illicit actor. They further confirmed, during a conference call, that the COP was “a personal friend” of this illicit actor. Donor1 did not provide an appropriate response to the formal complaint, and to date, it is unknown if any investigation was completed of this conflict of interest. Copies of reports of misconduct within Donor1 program, as well as the direct effects beneficiaries were facing due to that corruption, were provided to the US Embassy. The US Embassy staff provided further details on the illicit actor and expressed their lack of surprise regarding the COP involved. USDoS further warned of the illicit actors connections to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) a terrorist group, along with their suspicion of several assassinations that they believed he had arranged targeting local civil society actors.

Location: Goma, DRC & United States

ID#: 2019.Gold.14

Donor1 and their implementing partner DFP4, noted in 2019.Gold.13, attempted to facilitate support for two known illicit actors. This included an illicit actor who had a publicly known criminal history which included money laundering and misuse of state funds. This actor was also found by the UN Group of Experts to be financed by a secondary actor on a UN sanctions list.

Location: Mambasa, DRC

ID#: 2019.Gold.15

During routine inspections of ASM gold mining sites in the Mambasa territory several infants and children were photographed at the washing stations monitored by DFP1. DFP1 failed to report any prior or current child labor incidents or incidents of child endangerment, therefore, notice was sent to DFP1 that no further support would be provided to those sites by the beneficiary until it could be proven that conditions have improved and measures taken to prevent a repeat of said incidents. Further notice was provided once it was revealed by DFP1 that the cooperative beneficiary was in fact a subsidiary or an affiliate of the DFP, not an independent organization as DFP1’s senior management publicly claimed. It was also discovered that outside of the cooperatives management, who were all on payroll with DFP1, there were no other members, including those mining at sites claimed to be under the direct supervision of DFP1. Only recently had the cooperative begun selling membership to increase its ranks, a measure taken once it was discovered that DFP1 would no longer be funding cooperative salaries. The beneficiary considered this to be a gross missrepresentation by DFP1 and set out to discuss directly with the cooperative beneficiary ways of remedying their situation. DFP1’s program has since been terminated.

2020

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2020.Gold.01

An interim beneficiary staff member visited the Congolese Central Bank offices to formally address several attempts of illegal taxation. Three visits were made in total although only one meeting request was granted. As funds were already seized by the central bank, and the internal regulation cited as the reason of seizure revoked, there was no agreement by the central bank to return funds.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2020.Gold.02

An interim beneficiary staff member visited the state tax offices to formally address several attempts of illegal taxation. During this meeting the tax officer stated that if the full amount of taxes were not paid in full immediately that the staff member would be arrested. The tax officer proceeded to call an unknown person or organization while in front of the staff member and instructed them to pick her up immediately to force payment.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2020.Gold.03

An interim beneficiary staff member visited the state mining service offices to process a provincial transfer of gold, with a value in excess of $200,000, kept in Bukavu, to the neighboring province. While leaving one of the state mining service offices, she was picked up by three armed assailants and forced into a nearby car. She was taken to a construction site where a fourth assailant showed up and tortured her for approximately two to four hours. The subject’s bag was taken immediately once she was forced into the car. It is unknown when the assailants discovered and removed any contents of the bag, including the gold shipment she was carrying. She was left at the site by the assailants though was able to contact her assigned driver who took her to Panzi Hospital for treatment. She suffered severe and permanent mental and physical damage which are detailed in:

-Medical report completed by Panzi Hospital;

-Police report completed by South Kivu Police Department;

-Pictures and video taken by Panzi staff among others;

-Subsequent medical reports and related hospitalization records.

The whereabouts of the contents of her bag are unknown and assumed stolen. One of the assailants, the leader of the group, is known to the staff member as the same state security officer that led her interrogation, while she was pregnant, in 2018 (ID# 2018.Gold.08). The hospital evacuated her from the province where she was placed under armed protection as she recovered, listed as a protected person by the United Nations Joint Humans Rights Office (UNJHRO). Upon her partial recovery, she, and her family, were evacuated from the country. Upon advisement of critical stakeholders, public reporting of this incident was withheld until the evacuation was complete and the affected individual out of immediate harms way.

-Stakeholders informed and/or assisting with this incident and its aftermath include, though are not limited to:

-The United States Ambassador to the DRC;

-United States Department of State;

-USDoS International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau;

-United Nations Joint Human Rights Office;

-United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

-United Nations Group of Experts;

-Panzi Hospital & Panzi Foundation;

-Agence de Prévention et de Lutte contre la Corruption (APLC) within the Office of the President (DRC).

Location: Goma, DRC

ID#: 2020.Gold.04

Out of good faith, a grant was offered, through DFP1 country manager, to a beneficiary cooperative negatively impacted by incident ID#: 2020.Gold.03. No response was provided. Grant was revoked after it was determined that the beneficiary cooperative was no longer functioning as it previously was due to reasons outside that of the incident noted. Calls to the cooperative management were not returned, though it is believed cooperative management may have transitioned.

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2020.Gold.05

Trust Merchant Bank sent an email to beneficiary detailing the cumulative amount that beneficiary “owed”, in relation to incident ID#: 2019.Gold.11, after the bank issued an unauthorized overdraft loan to cover the debt from the central bank. No disclosure of the loan or its interest rates were provided to the beneficiary. Loan had an effective APR of 50%.

2021

Location: Bukavu, DRC

ID#: 2021.Gold.01

After being evacuated from the DRC, a former interim beneficiary staff member received several calls from the director of the South Kivu CEEC office. In the first of these calls, the director requested that the beneficiary come to their office to replace the sealed tamper-evident bag from incident ID#: 2020.Gold.03 with fake material (fake gold). Since the beneficiary considered this to be fraud, they refused. Subsequent calls were made to the beneficiary threatening arrest then elevating to threats of additional physical harm.

Location: Migori, Kenya

ID#: 2021.Gold.02

During routine mine site inspections it was noted that several police checkpoints were setup around areas where artisanal gold mines were clustered. Officers at these checkpoints were observed taking money from drivers and their passengers.